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ABSTRACT

In an effort to improve its economic and technological prowess, China in recent years has
promulgated measures that encourage patenting activity. These measures have had their intended
effect. Over a million patent applications were filed at China's State Intellectual Property Office
("SIPO") in 2010, making it the busiest patent office in the world-by comparison, a mere 600,000
were filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, placing it a distant second. The
disparity and trend is expected to grow in the coming years. But looking behind the headline
numbers raises doubts about the quality of China's patents and the degree to which the surge
reflects true innovation. For example, the vast majority of Chinese patents do not relate to actual
inventions, but instead to designs and minor improvements. The SIPO also suffers from problems of
understaffing and its average pendency period for the patent review process is suspiciously brief.
Surveys, anecdotal evidence, and studies also present reasons to doubt the quality of Chinese
patents. To improve patent quality, China should reform SIPO procedures and replace short-term
rewards for applying for patents with incentives that reward valuable patents. China should more
generally reorient its "innovation agenda" away from intellectual property procurement.
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CHINESE PATENT QUALITY: RUNNING THE NUMBERS AND POSSIBLE
REMEDIES
MARK LIANG*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, policy makers, academics, and others have been preoccupied
with the issue of whether China can become a truly innovative country.' There is
little doubt that China's economic growth-averaging over eight percent annually
since 20002-over the past few decades has been impressive. There is also little
doubt that the key drivers of China's growth during this period have been
manufacturing and infrastructure development. 3 China has, within a generation,
effectively become the world's factory-the producer of the world's toys, furniture,
electronics, clothing, and other consumer products. 4 Few other countries have proven
as able to take designs and ideas for products and transform them into physical
tangible products as cheaply, efficiently, and on the same scale. 5 There remains,
however, an abundance of doubt over whether China can move up the industrial
value chain and begin producing its own designs and ideas for products and
technologies.6
Skeptics have reason to be doubtful. Few Chinese companies have brand name
recognition with products bearing their designs. 7 Chinese universities lagged far
behind their foreign peers in research output.8 Countless papers, reports, and
*0 Mark Liang 2012. Mark Liang is currently a patent litigation associate at Fish &
Richardson, in its Silicon Valley office. He graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in
2010, and the University of Toronto in 2007.
1John Quelch, Get Ready for China's Innovation Juggernaut, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/11/get-ready-for-china s innovati.html; Katrin Hille,
Innovation, Chinese Style, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012, 6:30 A.M.), http://blogs.ft.com/beyondbrics/2012/02/02/china-innovation-but-not-as-we-know-it/#axzzllOFocl6F;
Bill Fischer, China's
Long
March
to
Innovation
Success,
FORBES
(July
26,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfischer/2011/07/26/chinas-long-march-to-innovation-success/.
2 GDP Growth in China 1952-2011, CHINABILITY, http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating that GDP growth rate has exceeded eight percent in real terms each
year since 2000).
3 Pravakar Sahoo et al., InfrastructureDevelopment and Economic Growth in China 1 (Inst. of
Dev.
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
261,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/261.pdf; CTR. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK (2010), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2012.html?countryName= China&countryCode= CH&regionCode=eas&#CH
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2012) (showing that forty-seven percent of China's economy is manufacturing).
4 James Fallow, China Makes, the World Takes: A Look Inside the World's Manufacturing
Center Shows that America Should Welcome China's Rise-For Now, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1,
2007, at 48.
5Id.

6Id.
SGeneric
Giants,
DAILY
BEAST
(July
17,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/07/17/generic-giants.html
8 The
World
University
Rankings
2011-2012,
TIMES
HIGHER
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/201 1-20 12/top-

2009),
EDUC.,
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articles have also documented China's poor record in enforcing intellectual property
("IP") rights.9 The nation's poor IP enforcement record only reinforced the notion
that China did not care about intellectual property, in part because China has little
intellectual property of its own to protect.10 Some observers go so far as to state that
China's culture discourages innovation," while others note that China's education
system encourages rote learning to the detriment of creative learning. 1 2 And so the
story goes that China has become brilliant at reproducing what's already been done,
but is utterly incapable of coming up with the next big thing. 13
But if the explosive growth of patenting activity in China is any indication of its
capacity for innovation, the skeptics are embarrassingly wrong. Since 2000, total
patent filings at China's State Intellectual Property Office ("SIPO") has grown sevenfold. 14 Even limiting the data to patent applications that relate to actual inventions
(and excluding applications for patents relating to designs or minor improvements),
the SIPO surpassed Japan in 2010 to become the second-leading patent office in the
world as measured by patent filings for inventions. 15 The SIPO is expected to match
or exceed the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") as the leading
destination for invention patent filings by 2012, with seventy-percent percent of
those filings coming from domestic inventors. 16 Projecting the past decade's growth
400.html#score RI%7Csort rank%7Creverse false (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (showing that the top
two Chinese universities rank forty-ninth and seventy-first in research).
9Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property
Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 96 (2008); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What
Enforcement?, (Oct. 23, 2011), IDEA: THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 52, 2011.

available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948326.
10Mark Liang, Stopping Intellectual Property Infringement in China:
Approach, 11 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 285, 285, 287 (2010).
11Tara Lewis, A Culture of Innovation,

AM.

FOREIGN

POL'Y

A Three-Pronged
(Sept.

24,

2009),

http://afpprinceton.com/2009/09/a-culture-of-innovation/.
12Rob Gifford, Chinese Top In Tests, but Educators Call for Reform, NPR (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/29/132416889/chinese-top-in-tests-but-still-have-lots-to-learn;
Robert
DeHaan, Education for Innovation, A Look at China & the U.S., CHINA CURRENTS (2006),
http://www.chinacurrents.com/fall_2006/cc-dehaan.htm; Henry Sender, Rote learning Is No Answer
to a Search for Heroes, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9cbfe14c-f964-11eObf8f-00144feab49a.html#axzzllOSndEWY; Jiang Xueqin, How China Kills Creativity, DIPLOMAT
BLOGS (July 2, 2011), http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2011/07/02/how-china-kills-creativity/.
13Xueqin, supra note 12.
14

Applications for Three Kinds of Patents Received from Home and Abroad, 2000-2006, ST.

INTELL.
PROP.
OFF.
OF
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/200804/t20080416_380894.html

(last

THE
visited

Apr.

16,

P.R.C.,
2012)

(explaining that, in 2000, 170,682 applications were filed at the SIPO) [hereinafter Applications
from 2000-2006]; Applications for Three Kinds of Patents Received from Home and Abroad, 2010, ST.
INTELL.

PROP.

OFF.

OF

THE

P.R.C.,

http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/gnwsznb/2010/201101/t201 10125_570592.html (last visited Apr.
16, 2012) (explaining that in 2010, 1,222,286 applications were filed with the SIPO) [hereinafter
Applications in 2010].
2010, supra note 14 (explaining that 391,177 invention type patent
15 Aplctosin
applications were filed in 2010 at the SIPO); JAPAN PAT. OFF., 2011 JAPAN PATENT OFFICE ANNUAL
REPORT
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgillinke.cgi?url=/shiryou

e/toushin e/kenkyukai e/annual report201 1.htm

(explaining 344,598 applications were filed at the Japan Patent Office).
16Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (explaining that, historically, about seventy-five percent
of invention applications at the SIPO are from domestic investors).
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rates forward, the number of invention patents filed in China will double that of the
United States ("U.S.") a mere five years later in 2017.17
Nevertheless, the skeptics may still have a leg to stand on. To be sure,
innovation has increased in China as its economy has developed and to some degree,
the increase in patent filings does reflect progress. 18 But does the 700 percent
increase in patent filings in China over the past decade actually reflect a 700 percent
increase in the nation's capacity for invention? Or do impressive numbers instead
reflect other, more nefarious factors at play?19
The skeptics would answer yes to the latter question and assert that China's
patent numbers are a fiction covering up the true facts about its innovative capacity
and progress. 20 As an initial matter, the correlation between innovation and number
of patent filings is hardly one-to-one. 2 1 It's als0 difficult to believe that any nation,
particularly one as large as China, could turn a corner in such short order. 22 Looking
past all that, there is reason to doubt whether the quality of the patents being
applied for and granted in China. 23 The burst in Chinese patenting activity is a
product in large part from the Central Government's "innovation agenda,"-a leading
component of which are generous incentives for patent filings. 24 For example,
Chinese companies who file above a certain number of patents receive significant tax
breaks. 25 Tenure is more likely for university professors who are able to obtain
patents. 26 Patent application fees for qualifying individuals and companies are
entirely subsidized by local governments. 27 These incentives, among others, are all
part and parcel of the agenda's stated goal of 2 million patent filings (of any type) by
2015, making China's SIPO far and away the world's busiest patent office. 28
17Id. (explaining that growth rates have averaged 22.4 percent for the SIPO in 2010; 391,177
invention parent applications were filed); U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 to 2011,
18,
2012),
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.
(Jan.

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (explaining that growth rates have
average 5.2 percent for the PTO; in 2010, 490,226 utility patents applications-the equivalent of
Chinese invention applications-were filed with the PTO).
18 China Likely to Become World's Biggest Filer of Patents in 2011, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 16, 2011 (explaining that "[t]he rising number of patent filings [in China] showed
improvements in protection of intellectual property (IP) rights in China").

19Lee Chyen Yee, China Tops U.S., Japan to Become Top Patent Filer, REUTERS (Dec. 21,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/us-china-patents-idUSTRE7BKOLQ20111221
(explaining that the Chinese "government provided attractive incentives for companies in China to

file patent applications, regardless of whether a patent was eventually granted.").
20 Yee, supra note 19 (explaining that the Chinese "government provided attractive incentives

for companies in China to file patent applications, regardless of whether a patent was eventually
granted.").
21 Patents,
Yes;
Innovation,
No,
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
14,
2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/17257940?story-id=17257940 (explaining that "patents are easy to
file ... but gems are hard to find in a mountain of junk.").
22 Id. (noting that there is skepticism as to China's position as an innovation leader).
23 Yee, supra note 19 (explaining "[t]he idea of subsidizing patents is not bad in itself, however
it is a blunt instrument because you get high figures for filings, but it does not tell you anything
about the quality of the patents filed.").

24 Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21.
25 Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU3.
26 Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21.
28 Lohr,

supra note 25, at BU3.
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Quantitative measures of patent quality, much less innovation, are hard to come
by.29 The task is no easier for a country like China, whose institutions like the SIPO
are less transparent than their foreign counterparts. 30 Nevertheless, this paper aims
to present various metrics by which the quality of Chinese patents, and thus
innovation, may be measured.
In Section II, the substance and recent results of China's innovation agenda is
discussed. In Section III, the quality of Chinese patents is evaluated through a series
of selected metrics, and additional metrics are proposed for further investigation. In
Section IV, ideas for improving the quality of Chinese patents are proposed.
I. CHINA'S PLANS TO BECOME AN INNOVATION SOCIETY
A. Innovation Agenda
China only passed its first patent law in 1984.31 Since then, China has been
criticized for failing to adopt and meet international standards for IP protection. 32
The country's poor enforcement record is well documented, as reports abound about
rampant piracy and counterfeiting. 33 Facing such criticism and acknowledging its
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") since 200134 and
the importance technological innovation to its economic growth, the Beijing
government has gradually come to recognize that a strong IP regime and ecosystem
is in its national interest.
Since the mid-2000s, the Beijing government has launched a coordinated
phalanx of laws, policy statements, and initiatives, all aimed at aggressively
increasing China's capacity for innovation. In 2006, the government announced its
fifteen-year Medium- to Long-Term Plan for Scientific and Technological
Development ("15-Year Plan"). 35 The 15-Year Plan included policies and standards
29Nin-Hai Tseng, Behind China's Surge in Patents, CNN MONEY (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/14/news/international/china1patents1innovation.fortune/inex.htm

(explaining that patent filings are not necessarily a measure of patent quality).
30Id. (explaining that Chinese IP law is hindered by a lack of transparency).
31Jiwen Chen, Intellectual Property Rights: The Amended PRC Patent Law, CHINA BUS. REV.

July - August 2001, at 1, available at https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0107/chen2.html.
32Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21 (explaining that China had "a deserved

reputation for trampling on intellectual property rights.").
33Fallow, supra note 4.
34
Member
Information:
China
and
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/countries e/china e.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).

ORG.,

35 ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C., OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY
1-2
(2008),
available
at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/developing/200906/t20090616_465239.html
(last visited Apr. 16,
2012) [hereinafter 2008 STRATEGY OUTLINE].
By 2020, China will become a country with a comparatively high level in terms of
the creation, utilization, protection and administration of IPRs.
The legal
environment for IPRs is much better, market entities are much better at the
creation, utilization, protection and administration of IPRs, the public awareness
of intellectual property is increased greatly, the quality and quantity of the selfrelied intellectual property are able to effectively support the effort to make China
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aimed at increasing indigenous IP development before 2020, including a series of
quantitative targets for development.36 Another key aspect of the plan was the
development of sixteen "megaprojects" focusing on key technological fields. 37
The 15-Year Plan has since been supplemented by other policy statements and
objectives, all recognizing the importance of establishing and expanding the
community of stakeholders in a strong IP regime. 38
Such policy statements
encourage IP transfer and alliances among companies, universities, and research
institutes, in order to catch-up and "leapfrog" into positions of leadership in several
technological areas such as clean energy, electric vehicles, and computing
technology. 39
The 15-Year Plan was followed by the National Intellectual Property Strategy of
2008 (the "2008 Strategy"). 40 The 2008 Strategy emphasized the importance of
creating and utilizing IP.41 More concretely, the 2008 Strategy sought to make IP
creation and use ubiquitous in the research and innovation activities of companies
and government bodies. 42 For example, the strategy encouraged companies to
incorporate IP into their technical standards and encouraged universities to
commercialize their IP.43 The 2008 Strategy also included benchmarks, proclaiming
that by 2014:
China will rank among the advanced countries of the world in terms of the
annual number of patents for inventions granted to the domestic applicants,
while the number of overseas patent applications filed by Chinese
applicants should greatly increase. A number of world-famous brands will
emerge. The proportion of the GDP accounted for by the value of core
copyright industries will greatly increase. China should own the rights to a
number of high-quality new varieties of plants and high-level layoutdesigns of integrated circuits. Trade secrets, geographical indications,
genetic resources, traditional knowledge as well as folklores will be
effectively protected and reasonably utilized. 44
In its more recent National Patent Development Strategy of 2010,45 the
government was even more assertive about benchmarks for future performance.
Highlights include:
an innovative country, the role of the intellectual property system in promoting
economic development, the culture prosperity and social progress in China become
very apparent.
Id.; Cong Cao et al., China's 15-year Science and Technology Plan, 2006 PHYSICS TODAY 38, 38
(2006).
36See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39

Id.

40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.

44Id.

45 ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF.

(2011-2020)

3

OF THE P.R.C., NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

(2011),

available

at
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*

By 2020, a quadrupling of the number of inventions per capita
and quantity of Chinese-origin patent applications filed abroad. 46

*

By 2015, the number of patent filings will reach 2 million. By
comparison, in 2010, about a quarter of that number was filed at
the PTO. 47

*

By 2015, China will rank in the top two for number of invention
patents granted to domestic applicants. 48

*

In 2015, 100 billion yuan (15.8 billion USD) of IP transactions
will be conducted. 49

*

By 2015, the average time needed to examine a patent, or
pendency period, will be reduced to 22 months for invention
patent applications and 3 months for utility and design
patents.5 0 By comparison, the pendency period for the PTO in
recent years has been around 34 months for the U.S. equivalent
of invention patent applications.5 1

*

By 2015, the number of SIPO patent examiners will reach
9000.52

*

By 2015, the number of registered patent agents will reach

10,000.53
*

By 2015, the establishment of a national data center, 5 regional
patent information service centers and 47 local patent
information service centers. 54

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf

(last

visited

Apr. 16, 2012) [hereinafter 2011 PATENT STRATEGY].
46

Id.

U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 to 2011, supra note 17 (explaining that
520,277 total patent applications were filed at the PTO is 2010).
48 2011 PATENT STRATEGY, supra note 45, at 4.
47

49
50

Id.

Bob Stembridge, Chinese Utility Models-A Lesser-Known IP Strategy, INTELL. ASSET
Jul.-Aug.
2010,
at
9,
available
at
http://www.iammagazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=360063cO-7f68-4124-868c-eef64e3e lff4 (explaining that there
are three types of Chinese patents).
51Traditional
Total
Pendency,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
MGMT.,

http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/kpis/kpiOverallPendency.kpixml

2012).
52 2011
54

PATENT STRATEGY, supra note 45, at 5

Id. at335,11.

(last

visited

Apr.

16,
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In order to achieve these lofty objectives, the Chinese government, local
governments, as well as universities and companies, have promulgated generous
incentives for the acquisition of IP.55 As summarized in an Economist article:
Professors who do so are more likely to win tenure. Workers and students
who file patents are more likely to earn a hukou (residence permit) to live in
a desirable city. For some patents, the government pays cash bonuses; for
others, it covers the substantial cost of filing. Corporate income tax can be
cut from 25 percent to 15 percent for firms that file many patents. They are
also more likely to win lucrative government contracts. Many companies
therefore offer incentives to their employees to come up with patentable
ideas.
Huawei, a telecoms-equipment manufacturer that craves both
government contracts and global recognition, pays patent-related bonuses of
10,000-100,000 yuan ($1500-15,000).56
In addition to the above incentives, the Beijing government offers better housing
for individual filers. 5 7 Some local governments also heavily subsidize the costs of
patent filings.5 8
Preferential corporate tax treatment also goes beyond a reduction in rates for
companies that file patents. China's tax code also allocates a special "patent box"
rate that reduces rates on revenue derived from patents and other forms of
intellectual property. 59 Qualifying IP is taxed at 0-12.5 percent, rather than the
ordinary 25 percent rate. 60 Further, lower tax rates are offered to companies that
spend at least 3 to 6 percent of gross revenue on research and development, derive 60
percent of revenue from "core IP" (meaning patents, software, and copyrights), have
more than 30 percent of their workforce with a college degree, or more than 10
percent employed in technical positions. 61
The Beijing government has, in sum, fully committed to making China a global
leader in innovation, with accumulation of IP playing a leading role. 62 The various
benchmarks that the government has proposed for 2015 and 2020 are ambitious to
say the least, and would put a significant gap between China and any other
country. 63
The array of aggressive incentives and policies should have the
5 Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21.
56 Id.

57 Lohr,

supra note 25.

Quality is China's Biggest Patent Challenge- Updated, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Jan.
20, 2011), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=e81c5421-bccc-4eb5-9895-f347443cf73e
(explaining that "as long as you fill in the forms correctly you will get your design or utility grant").
5 ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT ANDES, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
FOUNDATION, PATENT BOXES: INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY AND TAX POLICY FOR INNOVATION 3
(2011), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf.
6o0d. at 5.
61 Id. at 3.
62Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21 (explaining that the Chinese government is
anxious to promote innovation).
63 Nin-Hai Tseng, Behind China's Surge in Patents, CNN MONEY (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/20 10/10/14/news/international/china patents innovation.fortune/index.htm
(explaining that while patent applications globally are falling, growth of applications in China are
rising).
58 Joff Wild,
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unmistakable effect of boosting IP creation.6 4 But whether these initiatives will
result in true innovation, rather than the disingenuous inflation of various statistical
measures, is another question.

B. Recent Results of the Innovation Agenda
Before describing the recent impact of Beijing's innovation agenda, a brief
overview of SIPO procedures is in order.

1. Brief Background on SIPO Procedures
There are three broad categories of patents in China: (1) invention, (2) utility,
and (3) design. 65 Comparison to the PTO's designations can be confusing. A Chinese
"invention patent" is actually equivalent to the American utility patent.
An
invention patent presents a novel disclosure or teaching that is a significant advance
from the prior art-an "invention" in other words. 66 Invention patents are subject to
a lengthy "substantive" examination. 67 Invention patents by default receive twentyyear term of protection, starting from the filing date. 68
Chinese utility patents by contrast do not have a PTO equivalent-though many
other national patent systems, such as those in Germany 69 and Japan, 70 do grant
utility model patents. The Chinese utility patent represents a minor incremental
improvement over the prior art.71 The application process is accordingly short and
nearly superfluous; so long as an application meets basic form requirements, it will
be granted. 72 Utility patents also receive a shorter ten-year protection term, starting
from the filing date. 73
Design patents in China cover industrial designs or visual ornamental
characteristics of a physical article, much like design patents under PTO. 74 Design

64Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21.
65Stembridge, supra note 50.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.

69German Utility Model-Intellectual Property & Science, THOMSON REUTERS, http://ipscience.thomsonreuters.com/support/patents/patinf/patentfaqs/utility/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
70 Procedures for Obtaining a Utility Model Right (1##FITAJA
>), JAPAN PAT. OFF.,
http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgillinke.cgi?url=/tetuzuki e/t gaiyo e/model.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012);
EPO-FAQ-Japan, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/searching/asian/japan/faq.html#faq-446 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2012) [hereinafter collectively JapaneseProcedures].
71Id.
72 Id.

73 Stembridge, supra note 50.
74 JOSeph Simone, Design Patents Under China's New Patent Law, BAKER & MCKENZIE,
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/RRDesignPatentsUnderChinaMar/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2012);
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., A GUIDE TO FILING A DESIGN PATENT APPLICATION (2012), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/iip/pdf/brochure_05.pdf.
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patents also receive a shorter ten-year term of protection, starting from the filing
date. 75
China uses a delayed examination procedure for invention patent applications. 76
The delayed procedure has three steps: (1) preliminary examination; (2) publication
of application; and (3) substantive examination.
The preliminary examination
ensures that the patent meets all form and statutory requirements, which are
prerequisites to requesting a substantive examination.7
Publication of the
application typically occurs eighteen months after filing. 79 Publication makes the
invention public as prior art and also enables the applicant to charge fees for use of
the invention.8 0 The applicant then has three years after the filing date to request a
substantive examination. 81 If requested, SIPO examiners will assess the novelty,
inventiveness, and usefulness of the claimed invention and applicants must submit
prior art to assist the examiner. 82
A more lenient registration system is used for utility and design patents. 83 The
registration system in effect entails only the initial preliminary examination step
discussed above with respect to the delayed procedure. 84 As also discussed, the
preliminary examination step is limited to determining that statutory filing
requirements are met, such as ensuring that all documents are properly filed and all
fees are correctly paid. 85 No assessment is made of novelty or inventiveness. 86
After a patent issues any third entity or individual can challenge the validity of
the patent by filing a petition with the Chinese Patent Reexamination Board
("PRB"). 87 This proceeding is the SIPO equivalent of ex parte reexaminations at the
PTO. 88 The validity of a patent may be challenged on the following grounds:
unprotectable subject matter; double patenting; unpatentability or lack of novelty;
insufficient disclosure; lack of support; indefiniteness; lack of essential technical
feature (similar to lack of enablement); and amendment going beyond original scope
of disclosure. 89 After an invalidation petition is filed and assuming it meets all form
requirements, the PRB panel-typically composed of three members-will examine

75Patent Applications, ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C. (July
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/about/examinationAffairs/200804/t20080416_380173.html.

19,

2007),

76 LEI FANG, CHINESE PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 6 (2005).

77Id.
78 Id.
79Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Types
Of
Intellectual
Property
in
China,
PAT.
LENS,
http://www.bios.net/daisy/patentlens/2297.html#dsy2297_procedure (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
85Id.; Wild, supra note 58 ("[A]s long as you fill in the forms correctly you will get your design
or utility grant.").
86 Japanese Procedures, supra note 70.
87 J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Multinational Companies Need to Know About Patent
Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 N.U. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 450 (2007).
88 See generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TERMINOLOGY AND PROCEDURAL MILESTONES
IN
USPTO
REEXAMINATION
PROCEEDINGS
1-3
(2008),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/documents/term reexam proceed. doc
(explaining
ex
parte
reexamination process for comparison to Chinese Patent Reexamination Board).
89 Bai, supra note 87, 451-52.
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the patent based on grounds presented in the petition and any response filed by the
patentee.90 An oral hearing is normally held as well.9 1 It takes anywhere from six
months to two years for the reexamination process to finish. 92

2. The Numbers
Beijing's concerted and determined effort to grow patent filings has paid off,
probably beyond anyone's expectations. As shown in Figure 1, in 2010, just over 1.2
million patent applications were filed at the SIPO. 93 This is more than double the
number of PTO filings that same year. 94 A decade ago in 2000, by comparison, SIPO
filings totaled about 170,000, while PTO filings numbered just over 300,000.95 Thus,
while PTO filings have increased by 85 percent over the decade or 6 percent
annually, SIPO filings increased about 700 percent, or 22 percent annually. And
Beijing is far from satisfied with 1.2 million; as previously noted, the National Patent
Development Strategy of 2010 aims to increase this number to 2 million by 2015.96
Figure 1
All Patents Filed at PTO versus SIPO
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But the headline number of 1.2 million is misleading. The number includes all
three types of Chinese patent applications: invention, utility, and design. 97 Utility
patents numbered about 400,000 in 2010-but they have no equivalent in the PTO
90Id. at 452-53.
91Id. at 453.
92 Id.

93

Applications in 2010, supra note 14.
94U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 to 2011, supra note 17.
95Id.
96 Id.
97
Applications in 2010, supra note 14.
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system. 98 Thus, comparing total patent filings between the PTO and the SIPO
without discriminating against type is an unfair comparison. And although the PTO
recognizes design patents, such patents do not disclose actual inventions, 99 so
including them in the comparison also inaccurately depicts innovative activities in
the two countries. Finally, in assessing the inventive prowess of the two countries,
the relevant figure should be the number of indigenous patent filings. Foreign filings
say nothing about each country's inventiveness and should therefore be excluded. 100
In sum, a proper comparison is the number of Chinese-origin invention applications
filed at the SIPO versus the number of U.S.-origin utility applications at the PTO.
Figure 2 shows the number of domestic patent filings at each patent office, with
the comparison limited to SIPO invention applications and their U.S. equivalent,
utility applications.
As is apparent, the number of Chinese-origin invention
applications filed at the SIPO in 2010, numbering nearly 300,000, represents less
than a quarter of all SIPO filings. Nevertheless, the number exceeds the U.S. filings
at the PTO. 101 A trend is also worth noting: while domestic SIPO filings have risen
at an annual rate of 28 percent since 2000, PTO filings have risen at a more tepid 4
percent rate. 102

98 Id.

9 JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., 1 COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 1:47 (rev. ed. Oct.
2011) (explaining that "[a] design patent can be granted for an article of manufacture as well as for a
distinctive design, yet it is clear that the design patent encompasses not the function of an invention
but rather its distinctive appearance.").
100WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 2011 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 51 (2011),
available

at

http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/941/wipo-pub_941_201 1.pdf
(stating that in 2010, 293,066 indigenous patents were filed in China).
101Id. (finding that in 2010, 241,977 indigenous patents were filed in the United States).
102See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENT APPLICATIONS BY PATENT OFFICE, BROKEN DOWN
BY
RESIDENT
AND
NON-RESIDENT
(1883-2010)
(2011),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/xs/wipo pat appl from_1883_tab
le.xls (indicating that between 2000 and 2010, China's patent applications grew from 25,346 to
293,066, while American patent applications grew from 164,795 to 241,977).
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Figure 2
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Even if patent quality is questionable-which is discussed in the rest of this
paper-it is hard to deny based on these numbers that technological development in
China has progressed at breakneck speed over the past decade.
As Robert
Stembridge, an IP analyst at Thomson Reuters, noted: "It's clear [China's] moving
from low technology to high-tech. . . [w]e're seeing a stunning emergence of patent
filings in digital computing and data communications over the past few years-close
to 4000 percent." 103 Statistics from the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) show that in 2009, when many U.S. and European companies were slashing
Research and Development ("R&D") budgets during the recession, Chinese
companies increased their R&D budgets by 25 to 45 percent. 1 04 Chinese companies
now rank among the world's leading patent filers. Chinese telecom equipment maker
Huawei filed more patents than any company in the world in 2008 and was a close
second to Panasonic in 2009.105

II. QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF CHINESE PATENT QUALITY
Patent quality is inherently difficult to quantify using numeric metrics.
Assessing the objective "value" of a patent or the inventiveness of a patent is an
imprecise science that presents a number of normative and positive issues. 1 06
Measuring the quality of the patent examination process also presents a number of
103David Barboza, China Poised to Lead World in Patent Filings, ECONOlvIlX (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/china-poised-to-lead-world-in-patent-fiings.
104 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 2010 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 20 (2010),

available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/941/wipo pub_941_2010.pdf.
105 Barboza, supra note 103.
106 James Malackowski & Jonathan Barney, What is Patent Quality? A Merchant Banc's
Perspective, 43 LBS NOUVELLES 123, 123-24 (2008).

[11:478 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

492

challenges-what measures may be used to assess efficiency, thoroughness, and
accuracy?
Even assuming that the quality of patents or their examination can be measured
using some number or score, there remains the issue of how to calculate the score.
What variables and formulas should the calculation use? The challenge is all the
more daunting with China and the SIPO, given the relative lack of transparency and
available data. 107
With these qualifications and challenges in mind, this section presents available
data points that suggest that the quality of patents and the patent examination
process in China suffer from a number of shortcomings. This section also considers
other potential data points that are not publicly available, or would require
significant effort to research, that would further the analysis.

A. Available Data Points

1. Increase in Filings
The headline number of total Chinese filings-now over a million-is as
staggering as it is misleading. As discussed, there are three categories of Chinese
patents:
invention, utility, and design. 10 8
Only invention patents represent
significant improvements over the prior art. 109 In addition, any analysis of China's
innovative capacity should be limited to data relating to patents originating from
Chinese inventors and exclude those from foreign applicants. Thus, the more
accurate measure of China's innovative capacity is the number of domestic invention
patents that are filed each year.
Figure 3 presents the annual number of patent filings by category from 2001 to
2010, along with a first entry that is the average number of filings between 1985 and
2000. As shown, the number of invention filings each year has consistently lagged
the number of filings for utility and design patents. 110 In 2010, just under 300,000
invention applications were filed, or about one-quarter of all domestic filings.111 In
other words, only one-quarter of domestic SIPO applications disclosed actual
inventions.

107See also, World Trade Organization: U.S. Companies' Views on China's Implementation of
Its Commitments, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 6 (2004) (Indicating U.S. companies' beliefs that
it will be extremely difficult for China to implement greater "[t]ransparency of laws, regulations,
and practices.").
108Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993) art. 2.
109 Id.
110Applications from 2000-2006, supra note 14.
111
Applications in 2010, supra note 14.
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Figure 3
SIPO Applications by Type
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China's patent figures become even more grounded if one considers the number
of invention applications that are actually granted each year, rather than merely
filed. As Figure 4 shows, in 2010, 80,000 invention patents issued. 1 1 2 That is, the
SIPO found that only 80,000 invention applications disclosed significant teachings
over the prior art.

112

Id
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Figure 4
SIPO Grants by Type
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Another striking aspect of Figure 4 is the sheer number of utility and design
patents granted each year. Both consistently number more than three times the
number of invention patents. 113 There is nothing "wrong" with this. Utility and
design patents are not supposed to disclose substantial innovations and are
correspondingly subject to far less scrutiny in the review process. 11 4 But the fact that
utility and design applications are granted almost as a matter of course suggests that
the majority of SIPO-issued patents are "junk patents," having little to no economic
or technological value. 115 By comparison, at Japan's patent office ("JPO"), only about
8,000 to 12,000 utility applications are filed each year, compared to about 350,000 to
450,000 invention patent applications. 116 Likewise, design patents are not anywhere
nearly as popular at the JPO or PTO, where an average of 35,000117 and 30,000118 are

113Total Grants for Three Kinds of Patents Received from Home and Abroad (2011), ST. INTELL.
PROP.
OFF.
OF
THE
P.R.C.
available
at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/gnwsqb/201101/t20110125_570599.html
[hereinafter Grants in
2011].
114Aaron Wininger, Understanding IP Law in China, in IP CLIENT STRATEGIES IN THE ASIAPACIFIC, 2011 edition (2011).

115Wild, supra note 58.
116 JAPAN PAT. OFF., supra note 14, at 22.
117Id.
118s U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 to 2011, supra note 17.
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filed respectively in recent years-far less than the over 400,000 design applications
received by the SIPO in 2010.119
Recall that Figure 2 showed that the number of Chinese-origin invention filings
at the SIPO (just under 300,000) exceeded U.S.-origin utility filings at the PTO
(about 240,000) in 2010.
Comparing the number of granted patents in these
categories paints a different picture, as shown in Figure 5 below. In 2010, the SIPO
granted 80,000 invention patents that originated from China. 120
The PTO
meanwhile, granted nearly 110,000 utility patents originating from the US.121
Patent grants lag patent applications, given that applications precede any decision
on issuance, so one may expect China to eventually leap past the U.S. in the coming
years. 122 Nonetheless, as of 2010, the number of U.S. issued patents that disclosed a
novel invention exceeded the equivalent Chinese number. 1 23
Figure 5
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2. SIPO Staffing and Pendency Times
In response to increasing workload, SIPO has increased staffing of "substantive
examiners," who review invention patents. 124 The rate of increase, however, has been
far from sufficient to keep pace with the increase in filings. Between 2002 and 2010,
119 Applications in

2010, supra note 14.
120Grants in 2011, supra note 113.
121U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 to 2011, supra note 17.
122 Barboza, supra note 103.
123Compare U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 to 2011, supra note 17
(indicating 107,792 domestic grants), with Grants in 2011, supra note 113 (indicating 79,767
domestic grants).
124 ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2010), available at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/1aws/annualreports/20 10 [hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT].
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the number of invention applications rose by nearly 500 percent. 1 25 The number of
substantive examiners staffed to review these applications rose by less, 300 percent,
over the same period according the SIPO's own statistics. 1 26 The SIPO reported
about 2000 substantive examiners in 2010.127 But other sources place the number of
examiners higher at about 5000.128 It is unclear what accounts for this major
discrepancy. Based on the SIPO's accounting, the average workload per examiner
therefore increased by 60 percent between 2000 and 2010.
While it's probably true to some extent that SIPO's substantive review process
has become more efficient, it is unlikely that patent examiners have managed to
nearly double their examining efficiency. These doubts are reinforced when the
increased number of SIPO examiners is compared to equivalent figures for the PTO
over the same period. 1 29 As presented in Figure 6, the number of SIPO examiners
are outnumbered three-to-one by PTO examiners in 2010,130 though each patent
office received approximately the same number of invention applications that year. 131
And in a reversal of the relative growth in patent filings, the PTO has added
examiners at a faster rate in recent years than the SIPO.132

125 Compare Applications from 2000-2006, supra note 14 (referencing 80,232 Invention
applications), with Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (referencing 391,177 Invention applications).
126 Compare ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2006) (stating
that
roughly
1500
substantive
examiners
were
employed),
available
at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/annualreports/ndbg2006/200804/PO20080416559309499794.pdf,
with
2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 46 (stating that roughly 2000 substantive examiners were
employed).
127 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 46.
128 Wild, supra note 58.
129 Compare 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 126 at 17 (indicating that number of examiners
has increased from roughly 1500 to roughly 2000 during time period of 2006-2010), with U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, 53 (2010),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf
(indicating an
increase in examiners from 4779 in 2006 to 6225 as of 2010).
130 Suja Nair-Shirodkar, Patent Office Appoints 150 Patent Examiners to Expedite Process of
03,
2012,
8:00
AM),
Patent
Examinations,
PHARMABIZ
(Feb.
http://pharmabiz.com/NewsDetails.aspx?aid=67327&sid=1.
131 Compare Applications from 2000-2006, supra note 14 (referencing 80,232 Invention
applications), with Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (referencing 391,177 Invention applications).
132 Compare 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 46 (2000 SIPO examiners as of 2010)
with, USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 129, at 53
(indicating that there are 6225 examiners as of 2010).
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Figure 6
SIPO versus PTO Staffing
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Despite severe understaffing, SIPO has somehow accelerated the examination
process, reaching disposition on invention applications faster than before. Per Figure
7, the average pendency period-which measures how long it takes the SIPO to reach
a final grant or deny decision on an invention application starting from when a
request for a substantive examination is filed-has hovered around twenty-five
months since 2004.133 By comparison, the PTO's pendency period in recent years has
varied between thirty-three and thirty-five months. 1 34
SIPO's shorter pendency period would appear to be a good thing. A shorter
pendency period implies greater efficiency, and is preferred by patent applicants. 1 35
In addition, SIPO's current pendency period of twenty-four months is a significant
"improvement" from past years. 1 36 Figure 7 shows that the pendency rate exceeded
fifty months as of 2001.137 A study by the European School of Management and
Technology ("ESMT") found that the average pendency period between 1990 and
2002 was fifty-six months. 138
1332010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 46.
134Patent Pendency Statistics, U.S.
PAT.

& TRADEMARK
OFF.,
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/oai_06_wit_04.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
135Warren K. Mabey, Jr., Deconstructing the PatentApplication Backlog: A Story of Prolonged
Pendency, PCT Pandemonium & Patent Pending Pirates, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 208,
214 (2010) ("Timeliness is essential to reducing the level of uncertainty that surrounds patent rights
and promoting the efficient commercialization of worthwhile inventions.").
136Patent Pendency Statistics, supra note 134 (referring to first action pendency, not total
average pendency).
137 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 126, at 17.
138Johannes Liegsalz & Stefan Wagner, Patent Examination at the State Intellectual Property
Office in China 4 (Eur. Sch. of Mgmt. and Tech., Working Paper No. 11-06, 2011), available at
http://www.esmt.org/fm/479/ESMT- 11-06.pdf.
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But a shorter pendency period may also indicate that SIPO examiners are
simply being less thorough in evaluating invention patents. Examiners may just be
pushing applications through to a final decision under exceedingly short deadlines. 139
Figure 7
Average Duration of Substantive Examination at SIPO
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The high volume of applications, yet comparatively low number of examiners
and low pendency period implies that the substantive review of patent applications in
China is very poor. 140
The 2010 numbers for the SIPO-390,000 invention
applications, a pendency period of twenty-four months, and 2000 examiners-mean
that average SIPO patent examiner reviewed ninety-eight invention patent
applications that year, or one application every four days. 1 41 The burden on each
employer will only grow worse in coming years as invention applications have
increased at a rate of 22 percent annually in the past decade. 1 42 By comparison, the
2010 numbers for the PTO-490,000 utility applications, a pendency period of thirtyfour months, and 6000 examiners-mean that the average PTO examiner reviews
twenty-nine applications a year, or one every thirteen days. 143
Wishful thinking may suggest that patent examiners at SIPO are simply three
times more efficient than their peers at the PTO. This is hardly likely. 1 44 SIPO's
139See generally Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21; but see Wild, supra note 58.
140See generally Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21; but see Wild, supra note 58.
141 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 46.
142Compare Applications from 2000-2006, supra note 14 (indicating a 26.3 percent from 2000
to 2006), with Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (indicating a 24.1 percent growth in 2010).
143Patent Pendency Statistics, supra note 134 (discussing average pendency period);
Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf (6225 examiners as of 2010).
144See Liegsalz, supra note 138.
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figures instead suggest that examiners are hastily pushing applications through the
review process, without adequate investigation and consideration of the merits.
Given that the PTO has come under fire as understaffed and overworked with a
significant backlog of applications, 1 45 the situation at SIPO is a full-on crisis. 1 46
Differences in accounting and examination procedures may partly explain some
of the disparity in numbers. As previously noted, Chinese invention patents are
subject to a two-stage examination process. 1 47 The first stage, which applies to all
categories of patents, checks that the patent meets basic form requirements. 148 Not
surprisingly, in 2010, utility and design patents had pendency periods of 4.3 months
and three months respectively. 149 The second stage, called "substantive examination"
applies only to invention patents, and is more rigorous, ensuring that the invention
does in fact represent a significant advance of existing technologies.1 5 0 In reporting
the pendency period, SIPO may only be reporting the length of this second,
substantive examination stage, and ignoring the time expended on the first stage. 15 1
PTO calculations meanwhile measure the pendency from the moment the application
is filed until a final disposition. 152
SIPO's two-stage examination process may also explain why there are so few
patent examiners. An application's compliance with basic requirements is already
assessed during the first stage, leaving less to do for substantive examiners in the
second stage. 153 Given the confined role of the substantive examination process,
there is a reduced need for patent examiners. On the other hand, the substantive
examination portion of the review process is supposed to be more involved and
rigorous; 154 it's unlikely that offloading the preliminary examination process halves
the need for substantive examiners.

3. Low Application Fees
Patent fees also provide a proxy of relative patent quality. Rational applicants
will only file a patent application if they believe the resulting patent's expected
economic value is greater than the aggregate costs that must be paid, the uncertainty
145 See John Schmid, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Battles to Keep up, STANDARDEXAMINER (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.standard.net/topics/business/2011/01/25/us-patent-andtrademark-office-battles-keep.
146 See generally Statement of James M. Zimmerman, AmCham-China's View on China's IPR
Enforcement Record, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/051605/Zimmerman.php.
147 Prerequisites of Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA, § II (Peter Ganea et
al. eds., 2005).
148 See supra Part II.B.1.
149 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 45.
150 Highlights on Some Foreign Patent Laws-China, in PATENT LAW BASICS, § 20:2.85 (John
Gladstone Mills III et al. eds., 2011).
151 See, e.g., Mabey, supra note 135, at 216 ("Comparing pendency times across patent offices
proves as deceptive as measuring the number of applications pending or workload statistics.").
152 JaSOn J. Chung, Patent Pendency Problems and Possible Solutions to Reducing Patent

Pendency at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 58,
58 (2008).
153
154

See Stembridge, supra note 50.
Id
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of the success of the application, and opportunity costs. 155 Higher fees would
therefore result in higher quality patents. 1 56
Table 1 below lists the fee schedules for SIPO and the PTO respectively in U.S.
dollars. 15 7 As the listing shows, SIPO fees are significantly lower that equivalent
PTO fees. 15 8 An apples-to-apples comparison is difficult given differences in
prosecution procedures. For example, the PTO imposes a "publication fee" 1 59 and
"issue fee" 160 that have no equivalent in SIPO. 161 And while both offices charge
excess claim fees, the PTO's threshold is twenty claims whereas the SIPO's threshold
is ten.162

An instructive exercise is to compare the total fees that must be paid in each
patent office for a similar patent, assuming it does not have excess claims and is not
filed by a small entity. Applying for an invention patent at SIPO would entail paying
for the patent search, the initial filing fee, and a substantive exam fee. 1 63 The total
cost is 861 USD. By comparison, filing for the patent at the PTO, would require
payment of the patent search fee, initial filing fee, publication fee, exam fee, and
issue fee. 164 The total cost is four times more at 3290 USD.

155Jonathan Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 699700 (2010).
156 Id. at 699-700.
157See Schedule of Fees for Chinese Patents, ALL-CHINA PATENT AGENTS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.liu-shen.com/docs/SFBEN.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); China Application Schedule of
Fees, PATENTINCHINA, http://www.patentinchina.com/chinese-patent fees.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2012);
Fee
Schedule,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee092611.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).

Exchange

rates were taken as of Jan 30, 2012, when 1 USD = 6.31 CNY.
158See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
160 Id.

161See generally China Application Schedule of Fees, supra note 157.
162 See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
163See generally China Application Schedule of Fees, supra note 157.
164Fe
Schedule,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMVARK
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee092611.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
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Table 1
SIPO versus PTO Fees (all in USD)

SIPO

Patent Search

314

Patent Search

620

PTO
(small
entity)
310

Initial Filing Fee

151

Initial Filing Fee

380

190

Publication Fee

300

Per claim charge for
excess over 20
Exam Fee (utility)

60

30

250

125

Issue Fee

1740
4800

870
2400

Maintenance at year
3.5 (annualized)

323

161

Maintenance at year
7.5 (annualized)
Maintenance at year
11.5 (annualized)
Maintenance after
year 11.5

713

356

1183

591

0

0

Per claim charge for
excess over 10
Substantive Exam
Fee

24
396

PTO

Prioritized Exam
Maintenance (year 13)
Maintenance (year 46)
Maintenance (year 79)
Maintenance (year 1012)
Maintenance (year 1315)
Maintenance (year 1620)
Filing for invalidity
proceeding

143
190
317
634
951
1268
475

Filing for invalidity

2520

proceeding

What's more, Table 1 understates the true financial burden of SIPO fees on most
applicants. As discussed, local governments in China waive fees or offer significant
subsidies to many applicants. 1 65 Table 1 is also limited to fees paid collected by the
respective patent offices. 166 They do not include attorneys' fees, which are probably
higher in the U.S.167 An applicant hiring a reputable U.S. law firm will probably
spend 11,000 to 15,000 USD on attorney's fees per patent. 1 68 Chinese law firms by
contrast charge anywhere from 800 USD to just under 2000 USD. 1 69

165Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21.

166See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
167Compare Masur, supra note 155, at 699, with China Application Schedule of Fees, supra
note 157 (setting a Chinese patent firm's fees at roughly 1349 USD per patent).
168Masur, supra note 155, at 699.
169See Schedule of Fees for Chinese Patents, supra note 157; see also On the Quality of Chinese
CHINA,
ONE
BLOG
AT
A
TIME
(Mar.
24,
2011),
Patents,
UNDERSTANDING
http://wtdevflnt.wordpress.com/2011/03/24/on-the-quality-of-chinese-patents/
[hereinafter Quality]
(putting the cost of attorneys' fees at 633 CNY or roughly 100 USD).
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4. Triadic Patents and PCTApplications
Another indicator of the quality of Chinese patents is their recognition abroad in
foreign patent offices. It's one thing for the local SIPO to receive and grant hundreds
of thousands of domestic applications; it's another for those applications to receive
the approval of foreign offices whose examination processes are more established. 170
One such indicator is the number of "triadic patent families" that originate from
Chinese inventors each year. A triadic patent family is a set of patents that cover the
same invention and has been granted by all three of the PTO, the JPO, and the
European Patent Office ("EPO"). 171 A triadic patent family has therefore received the
stamp of approval from all three of the world's most established patent offices. 1 72
Such universal approval suggests that patents within a triadic patent family are
higher quality, not only because of its allowance by three patent offices, but also
because the applicant considered it worthwhile to invest in its protection in three
large and geographically disparate markets. 1 73

170See T. Randolph Beard, et al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some
Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 240, 255-56 (describing the effectiveness of foreign
patentability as a method of patent valuation).
171ORG. ECON. CO-OP & DEV., FACTBOOK 2011-2012: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
STATISTICS 182-83 (2011), [hereinafter OECD FACTBOOK], available at http://www.oecdilibrary.org/economics/oecd-factbook-2011-2012_factbook-2011-en (follow "expand" hyperlink next to
"Science & Technology;" then follow "Patents" hyperlink).
172Beard, supra note 170, at 256.
173OECD FACTBOOK, supra note 171, at 182.
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Figure 8
Triadic Patent Families Granted Each Year by Origin
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As shown in Figure 8, Chinese inventors have been credited with only 500
triadic patent families as of 2009, which is actually far more than in previous
years. 174
Meanwhile, the U.S. and Japanese inventors have been issued
approximately 13,000 to 16,000 triadic patent families annually for the past
decade. 175 As measured by triadic patent families then, China is far behind its peers
and far from being regarded as a world technology power.
The triadic patent data, though, suffers from one obvious problem. It uses the
PTO, EPO, and JPO as the patent offices for its assessment, and excludes the
SIPO.176 Applicants tend to file protection in their home jurisdiction. 177 Thus, Japan,
the U.S., and Germany have a significant and inherent advantage of hosting one of
the patent offices that is used to define a triadic patent. 178 Another issue with the
triadic patent data is its failure to account for the number of applications filed in
each of the respective patent offices, broken down by origin. 179 For example, it may
just be the case that-for whatever reason such as lack of awareness, incentive, or
Id. at 83.
Id.
176 Beard, supra note 170, at 255.
177 Ronald Yin & Sean Cunningham, Filing and Defending Patents in Different Jurisdictions,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MVANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION:
A
HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 953, 953 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/chl/ipHandbook-Cho2010%o2008%o20YinCunninghamo20Filingo20ando20Defendingo20Patents.pdf;
see also Patent Counts by
Country/State and Year: Utility Patents Report, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (recording
that forty-nine percent of total U.S. patent grants between 1963 and 2010 were domestic).
178 See generally OECD FACTBOOK, supra note 171, at 183.
174
175

1791d.
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resources-Chinese applicants simply do not care to seek patent protection in foreign
jurisdictions, or at least at the PTO, EPO, and JPO. The number of Chinese "triadic
applications" places an obvious cap on the potential number of resulting triadic
patents.
Figure 9
PCT Applications
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The number of applications filed by Chinese applicants under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") provide a measure of patent quality by similarly
assessing the recognition of Chinese patents abroad. 180 The PCT numbers convey a
more favorable picture of China's patenting activity on the international stage as
compared to the triadic patent data. As Figure 9 shows, the number of Chinese PCT
applications has grown by over 15-fold since 2000, totaling 12,296 in 2010, placing it
fourth among all nations. 181 As Figure 10 below shows, China's share of PCT
applications has grown from 0.84 percent in 2000, to 8.77 percent based on currently
available 2011 numbers. 182

180 Insofar as willingness to apply in multiple jurisdictions indicates that the patentee
considers his patent valuable, the amount of PCT applications serves as a measure of Chinese
Patent quality.
181 Leading
PCT
Filing
Countries,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/pct/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
182 Id.
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Figure 10
PCT Percentage Share
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Although China places fourth in the PCT rankings, an extraordinary feat given
its position a decade ago, the PCT numbers are not nearly as impressive as the SIPO
filing statistics, which put China well ahead of anyone else. 1 83 The triadic patent
family and PCT data collectively demonstrate then that Chinese innovation has yet
to receive global recognition. Chinese inventors, as a group, still appear timid about
seeking patent protection abroad. This reticence may be explained by a lack of
familiarity with foreign patent systems. 1 84 It may also be explained, however, by a
183Applications from 2000-2006, supra note 14.
184See generally David Hill & Judith Evans, Chinese Patent Law: Recent Changes Align China
More Closely with Modern InternationalPractice, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 359, 391 (1994).
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lack of confidence in the value own inventions, either because Chinese inventors do
not consider them worth protecting outside of China, or because they do not think
their patents can withstand the scrutiny of foreign patenting procedures. 185

5. Other StatisticalMeasures
Other available statistical measures provide additional reason to doubt the
quality of Chinese patents and the adequacy of SIPO's examination procedures.
The Thomson Reuters and Intellectual Asset Management conducted a survey
among 450 in-house lawyers and outside counsel worldwide at major companies and
firms in 2009, seeking their opinions of four major patent offices: the EPO, PTO,
JPO, and SIPO.186 The percentage of respondents who rated each patent office as
"excellent" or "very good" is presented in Figure 11.187 The EPO ranked highest with
satisfaction rates of 70 percent and 56 percent among in-house counsel and lawyers
respectively. 188 SIPO placed last, with satisfaction rates of 18 percent and 20 percent
among in-house counsel and lawyers respectively. 189
Figure 11
Triadic Patent Filings
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185 See generally China-BritainBusiness Council, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Risk
Assessment, Avoidance Strategy and Problem Solving ("The China IPR Guidelines'), UK CHINA IPR
FORUM

1

(2004),

available

at

http://www.chinabusinesssolutions.com/dbimg/china-ipr-guidelines1.01.pdf.
186 In-House and Private Practice Agree-The EPO Is Top for Patent Quality, INTELL. ASSET
MGMT., available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=1lf9cec8-4af8-42eb-93382fl49504d60d&q top+patent+offices#search=%o22top+patent+officeso22 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
187
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In 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OE CD") conducted a study of patent quality across its member nations and a few
other countries including China. 190 The study collected data for all patents issued
between 2000 and 2010 for each country, where such data related to: forward patent
citations; backward patent citations; patent family size; number of claims; generality
(or technology dispersion) index; and grant lag.191 Using that data, a "patent quality
index" score was calculated for each country. Precise scores and underlying data
from the study are not publicly available. But Figure 12 is a bar graph showing the
published results of the study. 1 92 It is apparent that China's index score lags behind
that of most OECD peers, including the U.S.

190 ORG. ECON. CO-OP & DEV., PATENT QUALITY INDEX BY COUNTRY, 1990-2000 AND 2000-2010,
190 (2010) [hereinafter OECD PATENT QUALITY INDEX BY COUNTRY].
191 Id.

192 See infra Figure 12.
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Figure 12
WIPO Study of Patent Quality

Another data point, and one that is most puzzling, is the low number of
invalidity challenges that are filed at SIPO. 193 One would expect the number of
193See, e.g., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124 (documenting 2411 invalidation requests, of
which 509 referred to invention patents).
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invalidity challenges filed each year to dramatically increase over time for a number
of reasons. First, the number of patents granted each year has grown at 22 percent
each year, thereby increasing the supply of patents that can be challenged. 194 Patent
quality and all other factors being equal, the number of invalidity challenges would
presumably grow at the same rate. 1 95 Second, as other data points suggest, the
thoroughness of the patent examination process has probably declined. 1 96 In other
words, there are not only more patents out there that can be challenged, a higher
proportion of these patents are also of questionable quality and could therefore be
more successfully challenged. Third, filing an invalidity challenge is cheap; cost
should not be a barrier. 197
Figure 13
Invalidity Proceedings
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Yet since 2005, the number of requested invalidity reexaminations has leveled
off at between 2000 and 2500 per year. 1 98 This holding pattern, superficially suggests
that the quality of patents has increased as a smaller and smaller percentage of
patents are being challenged-superficial because all other metrics discussed thus
far lead to the opposite conclusion. 199
194 See
195

infra Figure 13.

Id.

196 See supra Figure 7 and accompanying text.
197 See Schedule of Fees for Chinese Patents, supra note 157.
198 See supra Figure 13. Data collected from SIPO annual reports of from 2001 to 2010. These
annual reports are all located at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/.
199 See supra Figure 7, and accompanying text.
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Although the number of invention patents being challenged annually has
increased, the rate of increase-about 6 percent each year since 2001-is tepid as
compared to the increase in invention patent grants each year.200 It's also surprising
that challenges of invention patents constitute less than 20 percent of all challenges
given that invention patents are expected to withstand more scrutiny. 201
A final useful measure is the number of patent practitioners in China. The more
patent practitioners there are, the higher the quality of resulting patents as each
practitioner would have more time to work on each patent application. 202 Exact and
historic figures regarding the number of Chinese patent practitioners who prosecute
patents is currently unavailable. A few sources report that China had 6000 to 7000
registered patent agents in 2009.203
Given that about 980,000 total patent applications were filed with the SIPO in
2009, it follows that each patent agent produced 140 applications each year, meaning
they spent just over 2.5 days on each application. 204 This number is exceedingly low
in absolute terms; it's hard to conceive that even the most able patent agent can draft
a quality patent application and handle office actions and other tasks relating to that
application in just over two days. 205 The low quality of applications sent to SIPO
poses a clear limitation on the quality of resulting issued patents. The number is
also troublingly low in relative terms. The U.S. currently has 10,483 PTO-registered
patent agents and 31,569 PTO-registered patent attorneys. 206 Assuming that about
the same number of applications were filed at the PTO in 2011 as 2010-520,000
total patent applications of any type-and that only about half of PTO-registered
attorneys worked on patent prosecution, then each patent agent or attorney worked
on twenty applications each year, meaning they spent just over eighteen days on
each application.20 7 There is thus a seven-fold difference in time and resources
invested in each SIPO application as compared to each PTO application.

200 See infra Figure 13.
201 Id.
202
203

Id.

ALL CHINA PAT. AGENTS ASS'N,
ANNUAL REPORT 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.acpaa.cn/englishnew/content.asp?id=181; Development Plan of the Patent Commissioning
ASS'N
(Oct.
22,
2010),
Industry
(2009-2015),
ALL
CHINA
PAT.
AGENTS
http://www.acpaa.cn/englishnew/content.asp?id=172; Quality, supra note 169 (stating that there are
10,000 agents, but only 7000 actually practice).
204 Quality, supra note 169 (stating that there are 10,000 agents, but only 7000 actually
practice).
205 Jody
Lu,
Who Is
Making Junk Patents?, CHINA DAILY,
(Mar. 6,
2011),
http://ipr.chinadaily.com.cn/2011-03/06/content_12126586.htm.
206 Registered Agents and Attorneys, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., available at
https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/index.jsp (listing 10,483 PTO-registered patent agents and 31,569
PTO-registered patent attorneys).
207 See id. (stating the total number of persons registered to prosecute patents); U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 to 2011, supra note 17 (detailing total number of applications
at the USPTO).

[11:478 2012]

Chinese Patent Quality: Running the
Numbers and Possible Remedies

511

B. Metrics for FurtherInvestigation

1. SIPO's Allowance Rates
A patent office's allowance rate is, simply speaking, the percentage of patent
applications that are ultimately granted. 208 A lower allowance rate indicates a more
rigorous patent examination process. 209 Thus a lower allowance rate should correlate
with higher quality patents. 210 As a point of reference, between 2000 and 2010, the
PTO's allowance rate plummeted from 70 percent to 45 percent, which was viewed by
observers as a response to criticisms about thoroughness of the PTO's review
process. 211 Further investigation should collect data on SIPO's allowance rate,
broken down by time frame, national origin of the inventor or assignee, and the type
of patent (invention, utility, and design). The allowance rate for invention patents
with domestic Chinese inventors would be particularly relevant to assessing the
economic and technological value of Chinese patents.
Accurately determining allowance rates requires a great deal of effort and
resources. 212 China has not made its allowance rates publicly available. 213 Further,
as noted above, it is also a challenge to ensure that the allowance rates computed for
various patent systems are comparable given differences in patent examination
processes. 214 A European School of Management and Technology ("ESMT") study
computed SIPO's allowance rates from 1990 to 2002, using raw data on thousands of
patent applications stored in the EPO's Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
216
("PATSTAT"). 21 5 During this time frame, SIPO's allowance rate was 52.7 percent.
There is some dispute, however, over the extent to which allowance rates
actually reflect patent quality, or more fundamentally what the "allowance rate"
actually represents and how it is calculated. 217
At the PTO, many patent
applications are continuations, divisionals, or represent continued examinations of

208 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., FISCAL YEAR 2006, A RECORD BREAKING YEAR FOR THE
USPTO (Dec. 22, 2006) (defining allowance rate).
209 See Eric Chen, Conflicting Objectives: The Patent Office's Quality Review Initiative and the
Examiner
Count System, 10 NC JOLT ONLINE ED. 28 (2008);
2
10Id.

211Id.;

Patent
Allowance
Rate
Continues
to
Drop,
INVENTIVE
STEP,
http://linventivestep.net/2008/12/15/patent-allowance-rate-continues-to-drop/ (last visited Apr. 16,
2012).
212 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106.
213 See
generally,
Statistics,
ST.

INTELL.
PROP.
OFF.
OF
THE
P.R.C.,
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish2008/statistics (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
214 See Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent Systems (ECARES
Working Paper No. 027, 2010).
215 Johannes Liegsalz & Stefan Wagner, Patent Examination at the State Intellectual Property

(ESMT Working
Office in China 12
http://www.esmt.org/fm/479/ESMT11-06.pdf.
2

Paper

No.

11-06,

2011),

available

at

161d4

217 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106; Joff Wild, Patent

USPTO

Approval

Rate,

INTELL.

ASSET

MGMT.

(Mar.

Quality and the Plummeting
6,

magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=3fa6e5b7-6c7a-4387-8e54-821924c2eefe

2012).

2008),
(last

http://www.iamApr. 16,

visited
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other applications. 21 8 Some rejected applications are appealed and rejections may be
overturned. 219 Thus, the allowance rate may not really represent the percentage of
applications that are eventually granted. 220 But if consistently calculated across
patent offices and accounting for external factors, allowance rates should help
provide an approximate comparison of patent quality across patent offices and over
time.

2. Allowance Rates of Chinese Patent Applications in Other Major Patent Offices
In tandem with determining SIPO's allowance rates, further investigation
should determine the allowance rates for invention patent applications with Chinese
inventors that were filed at both SIPO and other foreign patent offices. This data
would show, among other things, the allowance rate of Chinese-origin applications at
the PTO, EPO, and JPO.
This data would reflect the quality of Chinese patents in two ways. First, if
allowance rate at the SIPO for these Chinese-origin patent applications exceeds the
allowance rate for those same applications at foreign offices, this suggests that
SIPO's review process is relatively less rigorous. For example, if SIPO granted 80
percent of Chinese-origin patent applications that were also filed at the PTO, but the
PTO only granted 60 percent of those applications, then SIPO's review process is
probably less rigorous than the PTO's.
Second, if the allowance rate at a foreign office for patent applications
originating from other countries exceeds the allowance rate of Chinese-origin
applications, this suggests that Chinese patents are inferior in quality. For example,
suppose the EPO grants 70 percent of applications in general, but only 40 percent of
applications from China. These results would indicate that patent applications from
China are inferior in quality to the norm for all countries at the EPO.
A key caveat to this methodology is that Chinese-origin patent applications that
are filed abroad may not reflect an accurate cross-section of all Chinese patent
applications. It may be that Chinese inventors only pick out their most promising
and valuable inventions for filing abroad. 221 Such a strategy is rational for at least a
few reasons. Filing additional foreign applications entails added costs. 222 Inventors
will only invest extra time and resources for inventions that they feel are

218 Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance
of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office-One More Time, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 379 (2009).
219 37 C.F.R. § 41.31 (Nov. 22, 2011 through April 4, 2012).
220 Cecil D. Quillen et al., Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office-Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35 (2002).
221Mary Ellen Mogee, Foreign Patenting Behavior of Small and Large Firms: An Update, SBA
OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (April 2003); Experts' Advice for Small Businesses Seeking Foreign Patents,
GAO (June 2003); Adonis Neblett & Richard Weiner, Protecting Biodiesel Trade Secrets Overseas,
BIODIESEL MAGAZINE 112 (June 2008).
222 Howard M. Eisenberg, Patent Cooperation Treaty, PATENT LAW YOU CAN USE, available at

http://www.yale.edu/ocr/pfg/guidelines/docs/PCT.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); Protecting Your
Inventions Abroad: Frequently Asked Questions About the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/basic facts/faqs about the pct.pdf (last
visited Apr. 16, 2012).
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worthwhile. 223 In addition, Chinese inventors may be aware that foreign patent
offices are more rigorous in evaluating patents, thereby lowering the chances of
issuance. 224 With these expectations in mind, Chinese inventors may only file higher
quality applications abroad.

3. Abandonment Rate
Another useful metric for assessing patent quality is the percentage of issued
patents that are ultimately abandoned. A higher abandonment rate suggests lower
patent quality. 225 Patentees will only pay maintenance fees-varying from 143 USD
per year and 1268 USD per year-if they are less than the financial benefit of the
patent. 226 The financial benefit of a patent in turn, provides an approximation of its
value or quality. 227 Presumably "junk" patents with no utility and novelty will not
result in financial gain for its holder, and would be abandoned. 228 Abandonment
figures would be especially useful in China's case since the government offers so
many incentives merely for filing the patent. 229 Given the rewards are all up-front,
with no claw-backs or deferred rewards, applicants have every incentive to file for the
patent, immediately receive their short-term benefit such as a tax break, and then
abandon their patent if it later issues. 230 Statistics on abandonment of Chinese
patents are not publicly available or otherwise easily determinable at present.231
As with all other measures, the abandonment rate suffers from flaws. Some
patentees may pay maintenance fees for junk patents based on purely subjective
valuations. 232 Others may stop paying maintenance fees for valuable patents for
strategic reasons, perhaps because of how they are managing their overall patent
portfolio.233

Another concern with abandonment rates is that they would tend to reflect the
quality of patents issued years ago. Abandonment of course can only occur after the
patent issues. 234 Chinese invention patents may be abandoned at any time during

223 Erwin F. Berrier, Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 473 (1996).
224 Paul H. Jensen et al., Application Pendency Times and Outcomes Across Four Patent Offices
(Melbourne Inst. Working Paper No. 6/08, 2008).
225 Craig P. Opperman, The Elephant in the Room, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (July/August 2009);
Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106.
226 Sara-Jayne Adams, Quality is the Key to a Bright Patent Future, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.
April/May 2008, at 55.
227

Id.

228 Opperman, supra note 225.
229 Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21.
230

Id

231 See

generally
Statistics,
ST.
INTELL.
PROP.
OFF.
OF
THE
P.R.C.,
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish2008/statistics (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
232 Jonathan Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival Analysis to
Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317 (2002).
233 Guriqbal Singh Jaiya & Christopher M. Kalanje, Managing Patent Costs, An Overview,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/managing patent costs.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
234 See Schedule of Fees for Chinese Patents, supra note 157 (detailing required maintenance
fees, which if not paid would result in abandonment of a patent).
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their twenty-year term of protection. 235
Presumably though, patentees rarely
abandon their patents right after issuance. 236 Instead they wait and evaluate the
patent's "performance"-as measured by value or revenues and profits derived
therefrom-for a few years before deciding whether to continue paying maintenance
fees. 237 Thus, the abandonment rate for a given year would not reflect the quality of
patents issued in that year or even the few preceding years. 238

III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As is apparent from the data and analysis presented in Section III, the quality of
Chinese patents and the SIPO's examination procedures is in need of
improvement. 239 In fairness, the data is not conclusive. This is in part because the
quality of patents and examination procedures are qualitative concepts-any
quantitative metrics only provide a proxy. 240 The data is also incomplete or
questionable, or can be explained or qualified by other factors. For example, there
are not many substantive examiners at the SIPO, but the SIPO's self-reported data
understates the number of examiners relative to other sources. 241 As another
example, China makes a poor showing in triadic patent family data. 242 But it may
simply be the case that Chinese patent applicants have not applied for international
patent protection because of cost or lack of awareness. 243
The limited data points that were collected still do point to identifiable areas of
improvement. These areas of improvement and other solutions to China's patent
quality problems are discussed below.

A. Increasing Staffing and Pendency at SIPO
The most obvious shortcoming of the SIPO's examination system is
understaffing. 244 The invention application to examiner ratio in 2010 was 195 to 1.245
This compares to a ratio of 80 to 1 at the PTO that same year. 246 And the PTO has
235 Id.; see also China - Intellectual Property Rights, EMBASSY OF THE U.S., BEIJING, CHINA,
http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/iprpatent.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
236 See generally Barney, supra note 232, at 325.
237
2

Id.

381d. at 330.
239 See supra Table 1 and Figures 1-13.
240 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106.
241See Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (stating that the total number of Invention patents
for 2010 was 391,177); Wild, supra note 58 (estimating that SIPO employs about 5000 examiners).
242 OECD, supra note 171, at 183.
243 See CHINA IPR GUIDELINES, supra note 185.
244 See supra Part II.A.2.
245 See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 124, at 37, 46 (indicating that the amount of patent
examiners grew 8% from 2007 to 2010, and further stating that the number of invention patent
applications received in 2010 was 391,000).
246 See USPTO Issues Record Number of Patents, INVENTIVE STEP (Jan. 17, 2011),

http://inventivestep.net/20 11/01/17/uspto-issues-record-number-of-patents/
were 6420 patent examiners in 2010).

(indicating that there
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commonly been referred to as understaffed. 247 These numbers assume that the
SIPO's own reported figure of 2000 examiners is accurate. As mentioned, other
sources put the figure significantly higher at about 5000, which would put the
invention application to examiner ratio at a less concerning 80 to 1.248 The SIPO's
reported numbers also show that the number of examiners has only risen 12 percent
since 2007, whereas the number of applications has risen by 60 percent in the same
period. 249 The SIPO therefore needs to quickly hire more examiners. Increased
hiring of examiners-particularly within a short time frame-is easier said than
done if the SIPO wants to maintain the quality of its examiners, which is just as
critical as quantity of examiners for the purpose of ensuring high quality patents.250
The SIPO's understaffing is all the more glaring in light of the office's
remarkably short examination period. 251 The pendency period of twenty-six months
suggests, in tandem with the staffing data, that each SIPO examiner reviews one
invention application every four days. 252 It is inconceivable that SIPO examiners can
thoroughly assess the novelty and inventiveness of applications so quickly, at over
three times the efficiency of their counterparts at the PTO. 253
In addition to increased staffing then, the SIPO should also consider increasing
the length of the examination process. Although a longer examination process is
sometimes associated with inefficiency, and is inconvenient for applicants, cursory
examination is as meaningful as no examination at all. 254 It unfortunately appears
that the Beijing government plans to take the opposite approach, aiming to reduce
the pendency period to twenty-two months by 2015.255

247 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106, at 124-26 (stating that the USPTO is
overburdened due to being "understaffed and ill-equipped to maintain pace with burgeoning new
technologies and a perceived flood of new patent filings").
248 See Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (stating that the total number of Invention patents
for 2010 was 391,177); see Wild, supra note 58.
249 See
ANNUAL
REPORT
2010,
supra
note
124,
at
37,
46
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/1aws/annualreports/2010/201104/PO20110420372588586402.pdf (indicating
that the amount of patent examiners grew 8 percent from 2007 to 2010, and further stating that the
number of invention patent applications received in 2010 was 391,000); see also ST. INTELL. PROP.
OFF.
OF
THE
P.R.C.,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2007,
26,
available
at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/annualreports/ndbg2007/200904/PO20090409585907998868.pdf
(stating that there were 245,161 invention patent applications received in 2007).
250 See Wild, supra note 58 (stating that although the Chinese are bringing in new recruits,
they realize there is a need for quality examiners, and that on-going training will be necessary to
create effective examiners).
251 See WIPO IP Statistics, Section A: Patents, Utility Models, and Microorganisms, WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
at
92
(2011),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/wipi/pdf/941_2011_section a.pdf (stating that over
the past twenty-five to thirty years, the pendency times for the EPO and USPTO have been
increasing, while the KIPO and SIPO pendency times have substantially reduced).
252 See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 124, at 45 (indicating that the pendency period for
substantive examination of invention patents applications was 24 months, 4.3 months for utility
models, and 3 months for industrial designs in 2010).
253 See supra Figure 6.
254 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106.
255 2011 PATENT STRATEGY, supra note 45.
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As noted before, the SIPO pendency period may refer to only the substantive
examination portion of the review process. 256 It may exclude the preliminary
examination process and other procedures or delays that precede it.257 The clock on
the PTO's pendency measure by contrast, starts running right when an application is
filed. 258 Thus a proper comparison would require adding on the time taken for the
PTO to conduct its preliminary examinations and any other delays. Given that the
preliminary examination process averages 4 months and adding another month to
account for other delays, the SIPO's average pendency period increases to about
thirty-one months. 259 This is closer to the PTO's pendency period of thirty-four
months, but is nevertheless problematic in view of severe understaffing.

B. Internal Quality Controls
The SIPO should adopt internal quality measures and checks to ensure that the
patent examination process is working up to prescribed standards.
Based on
anecdotal reports, the SIPO does evaluate periodic spot checks of the work of its
examiners, and even sanctions underperformers with salary reductions. 260 But there
is no evidence of how systematic or consistent these checks are. 26 1 More importantly,
the SIPO has not adopted any quantifiable metrics for assessing its own
performance. 262 The PTO's recent adoption of rigorous and quantitative methods of
quality control provides an example that the SIPO may borrow and adapt. 263
In response to complaints from American commentators and applicants
regarding the quality of U.S. Patents, the PTO launched a "patent quality initiative"
taking feedback and suggestions from seventy-one entities, including individuals, law
firms, and companies, regarding methods for improving the patent review process. 264
The product of that study was the adoption of a "composite quality metric" at the

256 See supra Part II.A.2; See also Weisun Rao, Intellectual Property Laws in China, in BEST
PRACTICES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA 4 (Aspatore, 2010) (stating that

utility model and design patent applications are examined for formalities but do not undergo
substantive search and examination).
257 See supra Part II.A.2.
258 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106.
259 See supra Figure 7.
260 See Wild, supra note 58 (stating that there is a sixty-person task force that monitors the
output of examiners, and if work is found to be substandard, sanctions or potential salary reduction
may be imposed).
261 See generally 2011 PATENT STRATEGY, supra note 45.
262

Id

263 See

PATENT

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., ADOPTION OF METRICS FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF
QUALITY

FISCAL

YEAR

2011,

available

at

http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init events/qual comp metric.pdf.
264 Id. at 2 ("[T]he USPTO received feedback and suggestions from seventy-one entities,
including individuals, law firms, corporations, associations, intellectual property organizations, and
government agencies.").
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start of fiscal 2011.265 The metric is calculated using formulas that take the weighted
inputs of seven numeric measures of patent quality. 266 The seven measures are:
1. Final Disposition Compliance Rate: measures the propriety of the
final disposition of individual applications, meaning whether the
final decision of allowance or rejection was proper. The compliance
rate equals the number of compliant actions divided by the total
number of reviewed actions. Collection of raw data requires random
sampling of applications. 2 6 7
2.

In-Process Compliance Rate: measures the propriety of actions
taken during the course of examination, meaning whether first and
subsequent non-final actions taken by the examiner were proper.
The compliance rate equals the percentage of reviewed actions with
no deficiency. Collection of raw data requires random sampling of
PTO actions that are not final. 2 68

3.

First Action on Merits ("FAOM") Search Review: measures the
extent to which the initial search for prior art performed by the
examiner complied with best practices. A score is assigned to
individual applications based on compliance with PTO best
practices.
Collection of raw data again requires a random
sampling. 2 69

4.

Complete FOAM Review: measures the quality of the first action
taken by a PTO examiner. This is like the in-process compliance
rate, but with a more detailed focus on the first Office action, with
analysis on a claim-by-claim level. The metric is calculated using
the average of individual scores of reviewed applications where
scores are based on compliance with best practices. 2 70

5.

Quality Index Report ("QIR"):
measures the quality of the
examination review process by assigning scores to the occurrence of
events in the prosecution process. Some events-such as actions
after disposal, requests for continued examination, and reopenings
after final-are associated with deficiencies in the examination

265 See id. at 1 (stating that the composite quality metric will be implemented at the start of
fiscal year 2011).
266 See id. at 3 ("The composite quality metric combines seven individual metrics, weighted in
accordance with their perceived impact and reliability as an indicator of quality, into a single quality
indicator."); see also, David Kappos, August Patents Dashboard Overview, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/august patents dashboard overview
(listing the percentage weighting of each factor).
267 See USPTO ADOPTION OF MVETRICS FOR 2011, supra note 263, at 3.
268 Id
269 Id.
2
70 1d
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process. The QIR uses an algorithm to calculate a final score based
on occurrence and frequency of these events. 27 1
6.

External Quality Survey: measures feedback from practitioners and
patent applicants based on quarterly surveys, which include a five
point scale for numeric assessment of experiences. 2 72

7.

Internal Quality Survey: measures feedback from PTO staff such as
examiners based on semi-annual surveys, which include a five point
scale for numeric assessment of experiences. 27 3

The PTO's above-described internal quality control program is not the perfect
one-size-fits-all method of measuring the efficacy of patent examination. It does not
purport to be. But the take-away principle-the use of rigorous methods and
quantitative measures to evaluate patent quality-is praiseworthy and should be
adopted by SIPO. But the take-away principle-the use of rigorous methods and
quantitative measures to evaluate patent quality-should be adopted by the SIPO.
In fact, since implementing the composite quality metric system, the PTO has
reported that the metric score has increased from 25.5 in the second quarter of Fiscal
Year 2011 to 35.2 in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2012.274

C. Other SIPO Adjustments

1. Increase in Fees
SIPO's fees are uniformly far lower than comparable PTO, EPO, and JPO
figures. For example, PTO search fees are double the SIPO equivalent, as are the
initial filing fees. 2 75
The PTO also tacks additional fees that find no direct
equivalent at the SIPO, such as issue and publication fees. 2 76 The SIPO's lower fees
would tend to result in lower patent quality. 27 7 The low cost of Chinese patent
agents and attorneys only amplifies the disparities, providing all the more reason to
increase.
But determining "ideal" SIPO fee levels is problematic. It requires balancing
interests in patent quality against access and economic equality. For example,
pushing fees into the hundreds of thousands of dollars would obviously result high

271 Id.
272
273

Id.

Id. at 4.
See
Patent
Statistics
Dashboard,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last viewed April 4, 2012) (indicating that
the quality composite score increased from 25.5 in FY2011Q2 to 35.2 in FY2012Q1).
275 See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
274

277 See Jonathan Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS, 687,
699 (2010) (indicating that parents of low private value will predominately offer low social value).

[11:478 2012]

Chinese Patent Quality: Running the
Numbers and Possible Remedies

519

quality patents. 278 But such high fees would also prevent anyone but the largest
corporations from protecting their ideas, which would probably reduce overall
inventive activity. 279 Such high fees also imply that only million-dollar ideas, or
expected million-dollar ideas, are worthy of protection. 280
A few benchmarks could be used to adjust SIPO's fee schedules. For example,
SIPO fees could be calibrated based on average national incomes in China. Based on
this measure though, SIPO's fees are actually higher than the PTO's. The cost of
filing a Chinese invention application 2 8 1 represents 17 percent of the average
persons income in China of 5184 USD. 2 8 2 By comparison, the cost of filing a U.S.
utility application 283 represents only 7 percent of the average person's income the
U.S. of 48,147 USD. 28 4
Average incomes, however, are a poor input to use for setting fees. Most
applications are sought and paid for by companies or institutions, not individuals. 285
Further, the typical "small" or individual inventor is likely wealthier than the
average person, especially in China where income disparities are high between the
country's majority rural and minority urban residents. 2 86 The vast majority of
inventors probably fall in the latter category of wealthier urban residents, and they
probably also hold university degrees. 287 Borrowing from PTO fee practices and
taking into account disparities in means, SIPO should adopt dual schedule fees-one
"ordinary" fee schedule and another "small entity" fee schedule. 288 The small entity
fee schedule would apply to smaller companies and organizations and all individuals
who demonstrate an annual income below some threshold. 289
SIPO might also adjust its fees such that the office is able to run without a loss.
The PTO for example, has generated positive income in past years, including in 2010
and 2011.290 SIPO's budget figures are not publicly available. Given a multitude of
factors though-the high number of examinations, low fees, low number of
examiners, and government's incentives for filing that further reduce fees-SIPO
probably operates at a significant loss each year.

278 See id. at 702 (stating that patents with high private value result in high social value).
279 See Barney, supra note 232, at 325.
280

Id

281See supra Part II.A.2.
282 China
GDP

Data,
INT'L
MONETARY
FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx
(Select "All countries",
select "China", select "gross domestic product per capita, current prices, U.S. Dollars", select "2011")
(last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
283 See supra Section II.A.2, and accompanying text.
284U.S. GDP Data, supra note 282.
285 See generally 2010 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, supra note 104 at 20
(detailing large increase in research and development budgets).
286 See Fu Jing, Urban-rural income gap widest since reform, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 2, 2010,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/02/content_952161 1.htm (stating that
China recorded its widest rural-urban income gap in 2009 since the country's reform in 1978).
287 See id.; 2010 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, supra note 104, at 20.
288 See supra Table 1, and accompanying text.
289

Id

See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., STATEMENT OF NET COST 2011, available at
the
net
(indicating that
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/mda_06_01_02.html
(cost)/income for 2010 was $94.7 million and $88.3 million for 2011).
290
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2. Increasing Incentives for Filing Invalidity Challenges
Given that the SIPO is now issuing a record number of patents, more than any
other national patent office, one would expect that invalidity challenges would rise in
proportion and similarly reach record numbers. 291 But as discussed, rather than
reaching new heights, the number of invalidity challenges has oddly peaked at below
2500 per year since 2005.292
The lack of growth is confounding, particularly since current fees for filing
invalidity challenges is not high.29 3 Invalidity challenges are not new to the SIPO
and their use steadily increased up to 2005.294 Further, in 2004, the validity of
Pfizer's popular Viagra product was successfully challenged in SIPO reexamination
proceedings, gaining nationwide publicity, 295 which suggests that lack of awareness
of the existence of invalidity challenges is probably not the problem. The SIPO has
also been able to resolve invalidity challenges at about the same rate as new
challenges arrive-2000 per year-so the process is not slow or inefficient.296
Statistics concerning the PRB's ultimate disposition of challenges have not been
published in recent years; an annual report from 2001 stated that 51.3 percent of
challenges were fully or partially successful in invalidating the patent.297
Identifying a solution is difficult given that the precise reasons why challenges
have been so rare are unknown. In any case, the government should consider
reducing fees for filing challenges further. The introduction of an inter partes
invalidity proceeding should also be considered, though inter partes examinations
have proven unpopular at the PTO. 298 Shifting or adjusting any existing burdens of
proof used in existing ex parte proceedings to be less favorable to patentees should
also help encourage greater use of the proceedings.

291See supra Figure 10 and accompanying text.
292 See ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 124, at 46 (stating that in 2010, the Patent
Reexamination Board received 2411 invalidation requests and 1946 invalidation requests were
resolved).
293 See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
294 See supra Figure 13 and accompanying text.
295 See J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Multinational

Companies Need to Know About Patent

Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449 (2007) (indicating

that the pharmaceutical company Pfizer's patent over the drug Viagra was challenged on the
grounds that it lacked novelty and/or failed to provide a detailed description as required under
Article 26 of the Chinese Patent Law).
296 ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 124, at 48 (stating that the Patent Reexamination Board
received 2411 invalidation requests and of those, 1946 were resolved in 2010).
297 See
ST. INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C., SIPO ANNUAL REPORT 2001, available at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/annualreports/ndbg200l/200804/t20080416_380289.html
(stating
that 1480 cases were closed, 41.6 percent were declared invalid, 9.7 percent were partially invalid).
298 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., USPTO REEXAMINATION STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 2012,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/reexamination operational statistic quarter ending_12 31 201
1.pdf (showing statistics for the first fiscal quarter of 2012, demonstrating that inter partes
examination requests have numbered 1/3 or 1/2 the number of ex parte reexamination requests in
2009, 2010, and 2011).
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D. Reducing Incentives for Patent Filings
The Beijing government should also dissolve its existing plethora of incentives
for filing patents. The motivation underlying these incentives-increasing and
improving innovation-is admirable. But there are better and more ingenuous ways
to achieve this goal than setting arbitrary benchmarks for patent filings and offering
tax breaks, tenure, and housing options that outweigh the costs of filing patents.
Such incentives have induced and will continue to induce a flood of utility and design
patents, which are often just officious terms for "junk" patents.299
By offering so many generous incentives, the government's strategies for
increasing innovation through IP may actually backfire and result in less
innovation. 300 Patents and IP may lose any relation to true innovation. 301 Rather
than equate patents with novel and useful inventions, companies and individuals will
instead perceive patents as a tax break, or some other short-term financial benefit
that bears little nexus to ingenuity and utility. 302 They will increasingly file and use
patents exclusively as tools for acquiring short-term gains.
Many of the incentives currently offered for filing patents should therefore be
eliminated. If such incentives are kept in place in some form, they should be
modified so that the financial rewards are not garnered unless the application relates
to an invention patent and until that application is actually granted. Better yet, any
rewards should be deferred, until the patentee presents evidence of the issued
patent's value. Such evidence may include: paying maintenance fees for at least
three to five years; issuance at one or all of the PTO, EPO, and JPO; and financial
statements demonstrating revenues derived from the patent or patented technology.
China's existing use of the "patent box" tax rate is an example of an incentive for IP
that in theory, should encourage high value patents, since the benefit of a reduced
tax rate is only realized on revenues that are actually realized from an issued
patent. 303
The government should also reduce its innovation agenda's emphasis on patents
and IP.
The focus should be reoriented towards funding and encouraging R&D
activities, as well as increasing collaboration between public and private sector
entities, as well as foreign and domestic companies. This shift in strategy might not
involve as many eye-pleasing benchmarks and results, but the shift will result in
better patents and technology.

299 Wild, supra note 58 (stating that patents are often seen as cheap and easy ways to get a tax
break, which can result in "junk" patents).
300 See id. (indicating that although the Chinese government believes patents can and should
play a major role in the development of China, currently business people in China do not see the
practical benefits of spending the time and money necessary to secure quality patents).
301See id. (stating that the combination of subsidized application processes plus major tax
savings create a large incentives to Chinese companies to apply for patents, but may not result in
uniformly high patent quality).
302 Id
303 See Atkinson & Andes, supra note 59.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The astronomical growth of patenting activity in China has firmly placed it
among the world leaders in innovation. 304 The feat is impressive given how it
occurred mostly within the past decade. 305 The feat also counteracts perceptions of
the country as nothing more than a manufacturing tiger that does not recognize or
respect the value of intellectual property. 306 But while skyrocketing patent filings do
indicate significant progress in technological development, there is reason to doubt
the quality of the resulting patents and hence, the degree to which the patent data
represents real progress in innovation. 307
Innovation and patent quality are inherently imprecise concepts. 308 To the
extent these concepts can be measured or quantified, complete and responsive data is
also difficult to collect. 309 Publicly available data points, though, suggest that the
quality of Chinese patents and the thoroughness of the SIPO's examination
procedures are below international standards and suffer from identifiable
problems. 310 These problems include: (1) understaffing of SIPO examiners; (2) an
exceedingly fast examination process; (3) low application fees; and (4) too few patent
practitioners. 311 Last-place survey results and limited recognition of Chinese-origin
patents abroad also provide grounds for concern. 312
But these concerns and problems are not without remedy. The SIPO's problems
of staffing, pendency periods, and fee levels, have conceptually obvious solutions.
More generally, China should reorient its innovation agenda's focus from cheap
patent filings to innovations with long-term value.

304 See supra Part I.

305 See Applications from 2000-2006, supra note 14 (showing that in 2000, 170,682 applications
were filed at the SIPO); see also Applications in 2010, supra note 14 (showing that in 2010,
1,222,286 were filed).
306 China Likely to Become World's Biggest Filer of Patents in 2011, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERVICE (Nov. 16, 2011) (explaining that "[t]he rising number of patent filings [in China] showed
improvements in protection of intellectual property rights in China.").
307 Patents, Yes; Innovation, No, supra note 21; Tseng, supra note 29.
308 Malackowski & Barney, supra note 106.
309 See Nin-Hai Tseng, supra note 29 (explaining that China patent information is hindered by
a lack of transparency); see also, World Trade Organization: U.S. Companies' Views on China's
Implementation of Its Commitments, supra note 107 (indicating U.S. companies' beliefs that it will
be extremely difficult for China to implement greater "[t]ransparency of laws, regulations, and
practices.").
310 See supra Figure 12.
311See supra Figure 7, Table 1.
312 See OECD PATENT QUALITY INDEX BY COUNTRY, supra note 190; see also Wild, supra note
58.

